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TRUST IN THE BALANCE:  
PRESCRIPTION DRUG RISKS, 
PATIENT PERSPECTIVES, AND 
LEGAL (RE)CONSIDERATIONS  
JOSHUA E. PERRY* 
DENA COX** 
ANTHONY COX*** 
DALE B. THOMPSON**** 
ABSTRACT 
Issues surrounding disclosure of pharmaceutical side effects are 
complicated. The literature abounds with pragm atic concerns regarding limited 
time or pharmacologic expertise in the clinic, patient nonadherence, and 
unintended nocebo effects, as well as philosophical arguments over the limits of 
autonomy, importance of shared decision-making, and the legal mandate to 
garner informed consent. Yet the actual thoughts and feelings of patients are 
largely missing from the literature. To investigate in greater depth and expand 
the debate to capture patients’ perspectives, we conducted a national survey 
exploring the gap between what patients want to be told about prescription drug 
risk and what they are actually told. Results from our research study indicate 
that many patients report having been “blind-sided” by previously undisclosed 
drug side effects and that a doctor’s failure to warn can result in considerable 
harm to both patient health and the doctor-patient relationship. Of real concern 
– and heretofore under-emphasized import – is the potential for erosion of the 
patient’s trust, which we argue offers a fresh evidentiary rationale to revisit the 
 
© 2021 Joshua E. Perry, Dena Cox, Anthony Cox, Dale B. Thompson  
*Graf Family Professor and Chair, Department of Business Law & Ethics, Kelley 
School of Business, Indiana University. 
**Professor Emerita, Kelley School of Business and IU School of Medicine, Indiana 
University. 
***Professor Emeritus, Kelley School of Business and IU School of Medicine, 
Indiana University. 
****Professor of Ethics & Business Law, Opus College of Business, University of 
St. Thomas. 
PERRY 02 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2021  12:48 PM 
28 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 24:1 
legal standard for what constitutes adequate patient consent and the importance 
of securing it.   
I. INTRODUCTION  
Prescription drug use among adults in the United States is at an all-time 
high. Nearly sixty percent of the overall adult population is using a prescription 
drug, with fifteen percent taking five or more medications each week.1 In some 
populations over the age of sixty five, usage rates can spike to over eighty 
percent, with between twenty-five and fifty percent of seniors using five or more 
prescription drugs.2 Moreover, for nearly two decades, it has been well 
understood that adverse drug reactions are an important clinical issue with 
implications for hospital admission and grave patient consequences, even when 
properly prescribed and monitored.3 One study of adverse drug events using data 
from the Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”) estimated that prescription drugs 
were responsible for two to four million cases of serious or disabling injury, 
including 128,000 patient deaths.4 Relying on data from the Kaiser Family 
Foundation, another study estimated that if milder adverse reactions are included, 
“about 81 million side effects are currently experienced every year by the 170 
million Americans who use pharmaceuticals.”5  
Against this troubling backdrop of real patient risk, one might assume that 
physicians are concomitantly diligent in their presentation of all the information 
patients might need to make a fully-informed decision whether and how to take 
prescribed medication, but several studies suggest otherwise.6 Research 
published in the last quarter of the 20th century showed physicians offering no 
verbal instructions for seventeen percent of prescribed medications and 
 
 1. Elizabeth D. Kantor et al., Trends in Prescription Drug Use Among Adults in the United States 
from 1999–2012, 314 JAMA 1818, 1825 (2015). 
 2. SLONE EPIDEMIOLOGY CENTER, PATTERNS OF MEDICATION USE IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
REPORT FROM THE SLONE SURVEY (2006); Dana Gelb Safran et al., Prescription Drug Coverage and 
Seniors: Findings from a 2003 National Survey, W5 HEALTH AFFS. 152, 152–66 (2005). 
 3. Jason Lazarou, Bruce H. Pomeranz & Paul N. Corey, Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in 
Hospitalized Patients: A Meta-Analysis of Prospective Studies, 279 JAMA 1200, 1200 (1998). 
 4. THOMAS J. MOORE ET AL., INST. FOR SAFE MEDICATION PRACTICES, ANTICOAGULANTS THE 
LEADING REPORTED DRUG RISK IN 2011, QUARTERWATCH 2 (2012). 
 5. Donald W. Light, Joel Lexchin & Jonathan J. Darrow, Institutional Corruption of 
Pharmaceuticals and the Myth of Safe and Effective Drugs, 14 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 590, 593 (2013). 
 6. J.E. Stewart & J.L. Martin, Correlates of Patients’ Perceived and Real Knowledge of 
Prescription Directions, 2 CONTEMP. PHARMACY PRAC. 144, 146 (1979); Louis A. Morris, A Survey of 
Patients’ Receipt of Prescription Drug Information, 20 MED. CARE 596, 596–605 (1982); Louis A. 
Morris et al., A Survey of Patient Sources of Prescription Drug Information, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
1161, 1161 (1984); Louis A. Morris et al., Counseling Patients About Prescribed Medication: 12-Year 
Trends, 35 MED. CARE 996, 996, 1001, 1006 (1997); Clarence H. Braddock III et al., Informed Decision 
Making in Outpatient Practice, 282 JAMA 2313, 2313, 2317 (1999). 
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discussing adverse drug effects less than one third of the time.7 In 2006, an 
observational study of physician-patient communication regarding prescription 
medication was published in Archives of Internal Medicine.8 This study again 
showed that patients were still not being consistently informed by their physician 
about the myriad adverse effects that might accompany a new prescription 
medication.9 Specifically, these researchers found that adverse drug effects were 
only discussed thirty-five percent of the time and concluded that information 
offered by physicians is often inadequate to address patient needs and concerns.10   
Justifications for non-disclosure have been proposed and defended,11 with 
compelling and nuanced suggestions for how physicians might approach partial 
disclosure.12 Such arguments necessarily involve interpreting and negotiating the 
bioethical principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, and patient autonomy.13 
Concern over the nocebo phenomenon, in which perceived or actual physical 
side effects may manifest based on the patient’s negative expectations, helps 
 
 7. Bonnie Svarstad, Physician-Patient Communication and Patient Conformity with Medical 
Advice, in THE GROWTH OF BUREAUCRATIC MEDICINE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE DYNAMICS OF PATIENT 
BEHAVIOR AND THE ORGANIZATION OF MEDICAL CARE 220–38 (D. Mechanic ed., 1976); Gregory 
Makoul et al., Health Promotion in Primary Care: Physician-Patient Communication and Decision 
Making About Prescription Medications, 41 SOC. SCI. MED. 1241, 1249, 1251 (1995). 
 8. Derjung M. Tarn et al., Physician Communication When Prescribing New Medications, 166 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1855, 1855 (2006). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Marie E. Gardner et al., A Study of Patients’ Perceived Importance of Medication 
Information Provided by Physicians in a Health Maintenance Organization, 22 DRUG INTELLIGENCE & 
CLINICAL PHARMACY 596, 596 (1988) (highlighting that there is a low percentage of patients who are 
counseled about medications and the content of what is communicated is often incomplete); accord 
Betsy Sleath et al., Asking Questions About Medication: Analysis of Physician-Patient Interactions and 
Physician Perceptions, 37 MED. CARE 1169, 1172 (1999) (illustrating the importance of physician-
patient question-asking about medications to detect and avoid potential medication problems as well as 
to improve patient compliance); accord Dewey K. Ziegler et al., How Much Information About Adverse 
Effects of Medication Do Patients Want from Physicians?, 161 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 706, 706, 
711 (2001) (explaining that patients desire all information concerning possible adverse effects of 
prescribed medication); accord Kalpana Nair et al., What Patients Want to Know About Their 
Medications: Focus Group Study of Patient and Clinician Perspectives, 48 CAN. FAM. PHYSICIAN 104, 
104, 106 (2002) (describing that patients wanted basic information about the medical condition being 
treated and specific information about side effects, duration of treatment and treatment options); accord 
Derjung M. Tarn et al., Which Providers Should Communicate Which Critical Information About a New 
Medication? Patient, Pharmacist, and Physician Perspectives, 57 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 462, 462 
(2009) (indicating that different expectations amongst patients, pharmacists, and physicians could result 
in communication deficiencies when patients receive new medications). 
 11. John T. Fortunato et al., When Respecting Autonomy Is Harmful: A Clinically Useful Approach 
to the Nocebo Effect, 17 AM. J. BIOETHICS 36, 41 (2017) (explaining that a justification for non-
disclosure is that the adverse effect on the patient arises from the patient’s own negative expectations). 
 12. Mark Alfano, Placebo Effects and Informed Consent, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 3, 4, 10 (2015) 
(suggesting that since more information does not always lead to better decision making, physicians may 
sometimes conceal information or even provide misinformation). 
 13. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 113 (8th 
ed. 2019) (establishing, along with justice, the four primary principles that have guided the field of 
bioethics for the last forty years). 
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explain why some physicians are reticent to disclose drug side effects for reasons 
rooted in best-interest-of-patient concerns.14 Indeed, a number of diverse 
published reports indicate that mere disclosure of a potential side effect may 
increase the possibility that some types of adverse side effects will manifest from 
a patient’s negative expectations.15 Accordingly, some argue that “more 
information doesn’t always lead to better decision making” and “concealing 
information or even providing misinformation” may be warranted emphasizing 
beneficence over autonomy, or arguably misconstruing autonomy altogether.16  
Claims rooted in concerns regarding patient adherence, however, must be 
considered in light of many other studies contradicting the notion that patient 
education increases the number of adverse effects or decreases compliance with 
the prescribed treatment.17 In fact, many studies have simply failed to find a 
nocebo effect, and in the absence of consistent evidence regarding nocebo 
effects, an approach that unilaterally withholds side-effect information seems 
overly paternalistic and difficult to justify.   
 
 14. Fortunato et al., supra note 11, at 41. 
 15. Rebecca Erwin Wells & Ted J. Kaptchuk, To Tell the Truth, the Whole Truth, May Do Patients 
Harm: The Problem of the Nocebo Effect for Informed Consent, 12 AM. J. BIOETHICS 22, 23 (2012); see 
also Don L. Jewett et al., A Double-Blind Study of Symptom Provocation to Determine Food Sensitivity, 
323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 429, 432 (1990) (describing that symptoms provoked by injections were placebo 
responses and were not responses provoked by the injected substance). 
 16. Alfano, supra note 12, at 4; Frank G. Miller & Luana Colloca, The Placebo Phenomenon and 
Medical Ethics: Rethinking the Relationship Between Informed Consent and Risk-Benefit Assessment, 32 
THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 229, 240–41 (2011) (explaining that physicians should be self-
conscious about discussing the risks and benefits of symptomatic treatments with the aim of promoting 
optimal outcomes while respecting patient autonomy). 
 17. J.S. Howland et al., Does Patient Education Cause Side Effects? A Controlled Trial, 31 J. FAM. 
PRAC. 62, 62–64 (1990) (illustrating that informing patients about drug side effects did not have any 
detectable adverse effects); Geoffrey C. Lamb et al., Can Physicians Warn Patients of Potential Side 
Effects Without the Fear of Causing Those Side Effects?, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2753, 2753–56 
(1994) (describing that informing patients of potential side effects prior to starting a new medication 
does not lead to an increased incidence of those side effects); Louis A. Morris & David E. Kanouse, 
Informing Patients About Drug Side Effects, 5 J. BEHAV. MED. 363, 371 (1982) (explaining that patients 
who were informed about possible side effects may have reported having experiencing them due to 
“attribution-labeling” rather than a “suggestion” effect); E.D. Myers & E.J. Calvert, The Effect of 
Forewarning on the Occurrence of Side-Effects and Discontinuation of Medication in Patients on 
Amitriptyline, 122 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 461, 463 (1973) (finding that the study results fail to confirm 
that forewarning patients of possible side effects either causes a greater number of patients to complain 
of such side effects or causes less frequent discontinuance of therapy); E.D. Myers & E.J. Calvert, The 
Effect of Forewarning on the Occurrence of Side-Effects and Discontinuation Of Medication In Patients 
on Dothiepin, 4 J. INT’L MED. RES. 237, 237, 239 (1976) (highlighting that the study results failed to 
confirm the hypotheses that forewarning patients of side effects cause a greater number of patients to 
complain of such effects, or that where patients experience side effects, forewarning is associated with 
any less frequent discontinuance of therapy). 
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Disclosure of all drug risks would be consistent with a “patient-centered” 
approach.18 The movement for a patient-centered approach to medicine seeks to 
avoid what the Institute of Medicine in 2001 identified as patients’ widespread 
“frustration with their inability to participate in decision making, to obtain 
information they need, to be heard, and to participate in systems of care that are 
responsive to their needs.”19 The patient-centered approach tracks with the strong 
continuing shift in both law and bioethics away from the paternalistic patterns of 
the past toward a more robust respect for patient autonomy.  
Nonetheless, in the case of prescription drugs, this approach remains far 
from the norm. Just two years prior to the publication of the Institute of 
Medicine’s findings on patient frustration, Braddock and colleagues published 
an in-depth, direct-observation study analyzing 1,057 audiotaped encounters 
between physicians and patients involving 3,552 clinical decisions.20  
Researchers identified medication-related decisions (new prescriptions and 
changes in dosage) and follow-up appointments as the most common topics of 
discussion and reported that none of the medication-related conversations were 
“complete” in terms of “informed decision making.”21  
The Braddock study concluded that “the ethical model of informed decision 
making is not routinely applied,” and noted concerns about impairment to the 
patient-physician relationship, as well as quality-of-care concerns flowing from 
patients not understanding their treatment regimens.22 Previous commentary has 
raised similar concerns about the impact of non-disclosure and partial disclosure 
on patient trust.23 In an environment with bountiful online information, direct-
to-consumer advertising campaigns, printed drug information inserts, nurses, and 
pharmacists behind the counter at retail pharmacy chains, most patients in the 
U.S. have numerous sources of education about the drugs they are prescribed.24 
Yet in the numerous studies referenced above, it is inevitably the prescribing 
 
 18. See Joan H. Krause, Can Health Law Truly Become Patient-Centered?, 45 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1489, 1491, 1489–99, 1502 (2010) (suggesting that informed consent is a shortcoming of the 
patient-centered legal doctrine). 
 19. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY 
CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 48–49 (2001). 
 20. Braddock III et al., supra note 6, at 2313. 
 21. Id. at 2317. 
 22. Id. at 2319.  
 23. Gerben Meynen & Guy Widdershoven, Dealing with Placebo Effects: A Plea to Take into 
Account Contextual Factors, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 19, 19–20 (2015). 
 24. See Joshua E. Perry et al., Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertisements and the Informed Patient: 
A Legal, Ethical, and Content Analysis, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 729, 754–68 (2013) (providing details about 
and a critique of the content provided in these sources of education). 
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physician from whom patients first and foremost expect to receive guidance and 
warnings regarding the medication being prescribed.25 
Physicians sometimes have legal duties to share warnings about these 
medications.26 These duties are based on the legal concept of “informed 
consent.”27  To determine whether informed consent has been violated, courts 
analyze physicians’ duties and possible breaches of those duties, along with a 
determination of “causation.”28 
Previously, in examining duties, courts had applied the somewhat-
paternalistic “medical community” model, where duties were determined by 
standard practice by the relevant medical community, i.e., what the physician 
would think should be disclosed.29 However, as courts have moved more towards 
a patient-centered approach, more jurisdictions have applied a different 
perspective. This perspective is variously called the “lay standard,”30  the 
“materiality of risk standard,”31 the “prudent patient” standard, the “objective-
patient” standard, or the “reasonable-patient” standard.32 Under this approach, 
the physician’s duty is determined by the patient’s need for information, i.e., 
whether a reasonably prudent patient could reasonably be expected to decline the 
treatment due to the potential risk of injury.33 Thus, decision-influencing risks 
are considered material, and must be disclosed in order to satisfy the informed 
consent standard. In court, a jury would determine whether a reasonable patient 
would have considered the risk significant in deciding whether to undergo 
treatment.34 To inform such determinations, it is important to collect specific 
empirical data to better understand the types of risk information that are most 
important in patients’ decisions to accept, or not accept, a prescribed treatment. 
In a general sense, the study we describe below is a first step toward developing 
a better understanding of how patients think and feel about being informed.  
 
 25. Nair et al., supra note 10, at 107; Christy J.W. Ledford et al., “Practicing Medicine”: Patient 
Perceptions of Physician Communication and the Process of Prescription, 80 PATIENT EDUC. & 
COUNSELING 384, 384 (2010). 
 26. David E. Seidelson, Lack of Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice and Product Liability 
Cases: The Burden of Presenting Evidence, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 621, 621 (1986) (“In medical 
malpractice and product liability actions, one theory of liability often asserted is lack of informed 
consent.”). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Causation includes both actual causation and proximate causation. See infra Section III.A.1 
(highlighting a more in-depth discussion on causation). 
 29. DiFilippo v. Preston, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Haggerty v. McCarthy, 181 N.E.2d 562 (1962); 
Roberts v. Young, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 675–76 (Mo. 1965). 
 30. Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 300 (Conn. 1983). 
 31. Febus v. Barot, 616 A.2d 933, 935 (N.J. Super. 1992). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Logan, 465 A.2d at 301. 
 34. Id. 
PERRY 02 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2021  12:48 PM 
2021] TRUST IN THE BALANCE 33 
Despite the robust discussion of these issues in light of shifting legal and 
bioethical norms, as John Lantos explained in 2015 that, “[n]o good studies have 
been done to find out what patients actually prefer [in the context of disclosure 
that creates tradeoffs between beneficence and autonomy].”35 Moreover, no 
study has explored the nuances of patient feelings when it comes to disclosure 
and the potential impact those patient feelings might have on the doctor-patient 
relationship.  
Our exploratory study had two main goals: (1) To examine how much and 
what types of drug risk information patients would like to receive from the 
prescribing physician in general, and (2) To understand the direct feelings of 
patients about specific instances in which they were not informed by their 
physician about potential drug side effects. These patient voices have been 
missing from the philosophical, legal, and policy discussions for far too long. 
Their inclusion now highlights the critical importance of this issue for the 
maintenance of patient trust with physicians and throughout the healthcare 
ecosystem. Better understanding of how – from the patients’ point of view – 
physicians have failed to meet patient expectations is critical to understanding 
how physicians can better enhance the trust that is essential to maintaining the 
physician-patient relationship. Additionally, this understanding ensures patient 
adherence to the prescribed course of treatment and provides the appropriate 
legal standard for gauging adequate informed consent. 
II. WHAT DO PATIENTS WANT TO KNOW? 
A. Research Sample 
A total of 508 U.S. adults ages 40-75 were recruited from the Survey 
Sampling International online survey panel. Respondents in this age range were 
used because research indicates that they were more likely to have taken a 
prescription medication.36 The sample was 48% female, 36% non-White 
(including 17% African American and 11% Hispanic), and 33% reported an 
educational achievement of a high school diploma or less. Of the sample, 67% 
had taken at least one prescription drug within the past six months. 
B. Research Procedures 
Potential respondents were sent introductory emails by Survey Sampling 
International, a national web survey panel firm, and invited to participate in an 
online survey via a link in the email. Five hundred thirty-nine participants 
initially chose to participate. Two initial screening questions disqualified a total 
 
 35. John D. Lantos, Do Patients Want to Participate In Decisions About Their Own Medical Care?, 
15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 1–2 (2015). 
 36. HEALTH AND BEAUTY AIDS; PRESCRIPTION BRANDS USED (2015), MRI University Reporter. 
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of 21 participants: 14 indicated they would not answer the survey questions 
honestly and another 7 indicated that they were not in the correct age range. The 
remaining 508 qualifying participants were asked the following questions: 
 
• “When a new prescription drug is advertised in a magazine, 
what information on the drug’s possible side effects and risks 
would you most like to see listed?” (multiple choice: all, most 
severe, most common, most important by the FDA, none). 
 
• “Have you ever had a side effect from a prescription drug?” 
(Y/N) 
 
• “If yes, have you ever had a side effect from a prescription 
drug that the person prescribing the drug did NOT tell you 
about?” (Y/N) 
 
• To gain a deeper understanding, we then asked respondents 
who reported this experience: “How did the fact that your 
prescriber did not tell you about the side effects make you 
feel?” to which they typed in open-ended responses.  
 
Following these inquiries, demographic questions were asked. This 
research methodology was approved by the Institutional Review Board at 
Indiana University. 
In response to the question asking about patients’ feelings and providing an 
open-text response box, a total of 127 respondents provided a total of 237 
discrete comments or thoughts (an average of 1.87 comments per respondent). 
These comments, often one word and occasionally much longer phrases or 
sentences, were then examined by the authors, who identified several distinct 
categories or themes into which the comments seem to coalesce.37 Next, the 
authors recruited two graduate research assistants, who, working independently 
of each other and the authors, assigned each comment a code corresponding to 
one of the themes. The two research assistants then compared their independent 
coding of the comments and found an initial concordance on 79.3% of these 
comments. They then discussed the 20.7% of comments on which they had 
initially disagreed and reached consensus on those items. The results of this 
analysis are described below. 
 
 37. See RICHARD A. KRUGER & MARY ANNE CASEY, FOCUS GROUPS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR 
APPLIED RESEARCH, 132, 132–42 (5th ed. 2015) (providing background information on analyzing focus 
group results). 
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C. Results38 
The majority (70%) of patients surveyed stated that they wanted to be 
informed about all of a prescription drug’s potential side effects. 
Slightly over half (54.1%) of respondents reported that they had 
experienced a side effect from a prescription drug in the past. Among these 
respondents, 46.2% (or 25% of the entire sample, totaling 127 respondents) 
stated that they had experienced a drug side effect about which the prescriber had 
not warned them. These respondents were then asked to report their feelings 
about their physician’s failure to warn them about the side effects they 
experienced. Their responses are summarized in the next section. 
1. Negative Evaluations  
A total of 124 comments (52.3%) expressed negative views and emotions 
regarding the prescriber’s failure to disclose a potential side effect. Specific 
themes reported by respondents and their frequency were as follows: 
a. Anger   
Twenty-one comments expressed anger or similar emotions toward the 
prescriber. These included terse one-word comments such as “angry,” 
“annoyed,” “irritated,” “mad,” and longer phrases such as “it pissed me off” and 
“this sucks and is a major flaw in our healthcare system.” Longer responses 
included: 
 
“I was extremely angry. . .the side effects. . .were worse than the 
condition that they were supposed to help. A very bad trade off!”39 
 
“Given that I was forced to go to a hospital emergency room when the 
‘prescriber’ denied that my symptoms could be a reaction to the 
drug. . .and given that a blood test done at the ER revealed that I had 
muscle damage caused by the drug. . .I was not happy with the 
prescriber. . .who is now my EX doctor.”40 
 
“I hate our medical/mafia healthcare system.”41 
 
 38. All direct quotations are taken from respondents’ feedback to our survey. Survey and responses 
are held on file with authors. For confidentiality purposes, all respondent names are kept confidential. 
Survey Sampling International Survey of Various Respondents, (2020) [hereinafter Survey Response].  
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
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b. Betrayal/Violation of Trust   
Eighteen comments expressed a feeling that the prescriber had betrayed, 
violated, or undermined the patient’s trust by not disclosing the drug’s risk. Often 
these comments mentioned the corrupting influence of the pharmaceutical 
industry on the doctor-patient relationship. For example, one respondent stated: 
“I felt like I could no longer trust doctors—maybe they were paid off by the drug 
sales people [sic].”  Another stated that the experience “makes me feel like they 
are just supporting the pharmaceutical industry.” Others simply reported feeling 
“conned,” “betrayed,” “misled,” “uncared about,” “used for financial profit,” or 
“cheated and uncared for.” The loss of trust was best captured by the respondent 
who simply stated: “Made me worry about all drugs he would give me.” 
c. Inadequate Patient–Physician Interaction  
Seventeen comments complained that the lack of risk disclosure was the 
result of a broader systemic problem: that doctors simply don’t spend enough 
time with patients. One respondent indicated feeling “awful,” like “just another 
number” about the clinical encounter in which risks were not disclosed. Longer 
comments included:  
 
“Doctors are very busy[,] and they spend very little time with you, and 
they don’t usually take the time to explain anything.”42  
 
“It did not surprise me at all since the Dr only spent 30 seconds on me 
before he started writing a prescription instead of examining me to 
find out what could possibly be wrong. I wasted $110 on that Dr visit 
and never found out anything at all about my condition because the 
Dr was only in the room with me for less than 2 minutes.”43 
d. Violation of Patient’s Right to Know   
Fourteen respondents viewed the omission of risk information as a violation 
of the patient’s right to know. For example: “All these things should be discussed 
during the visit in which the drug was prescribed.”44  
e. Other Negative Comments   
Many (51) of the remaining negative comments involved brief expressions 
of a wide variety of negative emotions, including “upset,” “sad,” “confused,” 
“helpless,” “horrible.” 
 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id.  
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2. Positive/Neutral Evaluations  
A total of 64 comments (27%) expressed positive or neutral evaluations of 
the prescriber after experiencing an undisclosed side effect. Specific themes 
included: 
a. Not the Doctor’s Fault   
Thirty comments specifically stated that the failure to disclose was not the 
doctor’s fault, typically because the patient’s reaction to the drug was perceived 
to be unforeseeable.  Representative comments included: “It was a fluke”; 
“Every person responds different to drugs, so they can’t warn about every 
possible side effect”;  
 
“It didn’t bother me because the doctor who prescribed it. . .had to go 
to the PDR [Physicians’ Desk Reference] and check and my symptom 
[tongue swelling] was at the very bottom as the very rarest of 
symptoms and something he had never heard of before. I just laughed 
and thought of course that would happen to me.”  
 
One patient also ascribed responsibility to the pharmacy rather than the 
physician.  
b. Patient’s Responsibility to Know   
Six comments expressed a “caveat emptor” position, stating that it is the 
patient’s own responsibility to learn about the risks of the drugs he or she takes.  
Example comments include: “I should have done the research myself”; “I could 
have read about it and didn’t”; and “I can read the insert of side effects.” 
c. Side Effects Mild/Trivial   
Seventeen comments indicated that the side effects were mild or trivial, and 
thus not a cause for concern.  Example comments include: “It was a mild, 
nuisance type of side effect”; and “It was not significant.”  
d. General Neutral Reaction   
Eleven comments indicated a neutral or dismissive reaction to the event, 
without providing further detail.  Example comments include: “I’m OK with it,” 
“no feeling,” and “meh.”  
3. Miscellaneous/Non-evaluative Comments   
The remaining 49 comments (20.6%) did not describe respondents’ 
reactions to the side-effect non-disclosure experience, but instead contained 
incidental background information, such as the name of the specific drug they 
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had taken, the name of their healthcare provider, or the medical condition for 
which they were being treated.   
D. Discussion of the Study Findings 
One of the central tenets of the doctrine of informed consent in both law 
and medical ethics is the patient’s right to be informed of the potential risks of 
medical treatments, including prescription drugs, before agreeing to undergo 
treatment. As stated by the American Medical Association’s Council on Ethical 
and Judicial Affairs, “[t]ruthful and open communication between physician and 
patient is essential for trust in the relationship and for respect for autonomy.”45 
But putting this into practice introduces a vexing question with a series of 
practical implications. How much risk information should patients be given 
about prescription drugs, and how is such information best communicated given 
a series of complicating dynamics? As the first in-depth inquiry into patient 
perspectives on this issue, our study offers the medical and bioethics community 
an important opportunity to re-evaluate the way this question is currently being 
answered.  
Our research points to several interesting findings. First, the responses 
illuminate a variety of harms that patients are experiencing and show that the 
ethical concerns that have been discussed in the medical community are indeed 
active concerns among patients as well. Of the respondents who expressed 
frustration, some frame it explicitly as an issue of doctors shirking their 
obligations to inform: 
 
“It pissed me off. I like to know up front about drugs before I start 
taking them so I can make an informed decision as to whether I want 
to take them or not.”46 
 
The question of responsibility also arose. While some patients expressed 
that they had a responsibility to research effects themselves, another respondent 
felt unfairly burdened:  
 
“Had to do my own research and then stop taking the meds. Doc 
should have told me and saved me some time and agony. . .I was 
chasing ghosts trying to figure out what was wrong with me.”47 
 
 
 45. CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: OPINIONS ON CONSENT, COMMUNICATION & DECISION MAKING § 
2.1.1-3 (AM. MED. ASS’N 2016). 
 46. Survey Response, supra note 38.  
 47. Id. 
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In other words, just because many patients feel that they need to do their 
own prescription research does not mean that they feel they ought to have the 
primary responsibility. As the above quotes illustrate, patients may feel harmed 
by poor disclosure practices in the form of misallocated responsibility, burdens 
on their time and resources, inefficiency, and wasted effort. 
The comments also illustrated a much broader reaction of distrust toward 
physicians and medicine, substantiating concerns in the literature that even well-
intentioned choices not to disclose side effects can backfire by eroding patient 
trust.  
 
“Made me feel the prescriber was not interested in my well being.”48 
 
“Mad. This doctor was a jerk. Made me feel as if [I] were a ‘Guinea 
Pig’ for this particular heart medication I was on for 26 years. I was 
not watched carefully enough for the issues the medication causes.”49 
 
As noted in some of the earlier commentaries on this issue, erosion of trust 
may lead to erosion of compliance, and thus, ultimately, positive outcomes.50 
Three respondents in our study dropped the individual doctor who they felt had 
failed to fully inform them. Others connected their experience with an 
undisclosed side effect with attitudes that evince a troubling mistrust of medical 
advice more broadly. 
One comment provides a clear illustration of ethical betrayal compounded 
by a pattern of interactions with multiple providers leading the patient to develop 
a broad and disturbing distrust of physicians in general: 
 
“I have never had a physician or medical provider EVER discuss side 
effects and that is wrong. It makes me feel like they are just supporting 
the pharmaceutical industry.”51 
 
Another comment indicates a severe loss of trust and willingness to comply, 
but also suggests that more information could in fact have made a difference in 
the patient’s attitude: 
 
 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Guy Widdershoven et al., Dealing with the Nocebo Effect: Taking Physician-Patient 
Interaction Seriously, 17 AM. J. BIOETHICS 48, 49 (2017); Hadley Bryan & Veljko Dubljević, To 
Disclose or Not To Disclose: When Fear of Nocebo Effects Infringes upon Autonomy, 17 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 50, 50–51 (2017). 
 51. See Survey Response, supra note 38.  
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“Obviously they are treating us as experimental test subjects as if we 
were human Petri dishes, and the drugs don’t really cure anything. If 
you take them you will just prolong the condition. . .Provide 
alternative information AND side effect lists.”52 
 
And of course, in addition to these potential harms, the direct risks of harm 
from prescription medication can be quite grave. In some instances, failure to 
inform patients of potentially serious side effects can result in a more debilitating 
condition resulting in a disastrous outcome. 
 
“At the time I had been sick for almost a full year when I found out 
that the drug contained an ingredient that I am allergic to. . .[W]hen I 
tried to talk to the prescriber, she turned it back on me and said that I 
should have known that I was allergic to the ingredient. I no longer go 
that medical office.”53 
 
“I stopped taking the drug. I would rather die because the side effects 
were so severe.”54 
 
In addition to illustrating some of the significant negative effects of non-
disclosure, our results also reveal some helpful nuances in patient views. 
Analysis of the qualitative data suggests that patients perceive some types of risk 
information to be more important than others. When patients were asked to 
recount how they felt after experiencing side effects that had not been disclosed 
by their prescribing physician, they were more likely to express negative 
emotions toward the prescriber (e.g., anger, betrayal) when those side effects 
were perceived to be both severe and foreseeable. However, respondents tended 
to be much more forgiving of the prescriber if the side effects were either mild 
or so rare and idiosyncratic as to be unforeseeable even by a conscientious 
prescriber.55  
III. LEGAL (RE)CONSIDERATIONS 
Manufacturer liability for prescription drugs has been an extremely 
important topic, both in the popular press and in law reviews. The opioid 
epidemic has led to multi-million and multi-billion-dollar lawsuits and 
settlements.56 Johnson & Johnson has been the target of a $17 billion opioid 
 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. See infra Section II.C.2. 
 56. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma Announces Agreement in Principle on Landmark Opioid Litigation 
Settlement, PURDUE PHARMA (Sept. 16, 2019), 
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lawsuit by Oklahoma,57 and an $8 billion jury verdict in a case over the 
antipsychotic Risperdal.58 
For manufacturers of prescription drugs, one of the most important 
limitations to their liability derives from the “Learned Intermediary Doctrine.”59 
 
https://www.purduepharma.com/news/2019/09/16/purdue-pharma-announces-agreement-in-principle-
on-landmark-opioid-litigation-settlement/ (announcing that Purdue Pharma, the manufacturer of 
OxyContin, had reached “an agreement in principle on a framework for settling the U.S. opioid litigation 
facing the Company with 24 state attorneys general…The settlement structure is estimated to provide 
more than $10 billion of value to address the opioid crisis.”); see also Lydia Ramsey, 4 Healthcare 
Firms Just Agreed to a $260 Million Deal to Settle Key Opioids Cases Ahead of a Trial, BUS. INSIDER 
(Oct. 21, 2019, 12:43 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/teva-cardinal-amerisourcebergen-
mckesson-settle-ohio-opioid-lawsuit-2019-10 (explaining settlement by manufacturer Teva and other 
health care companies for a combined total of $215 million in lawsuit by two Ohio counties). 
 57. Nate Raymond, Oklahoma Judge to Rule in $17 Billion Opioid Lawsuit Against J&J, REUTERS 
(Aug. 26, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-opioids-litigation-oklahoma/oklahoma-
judge-to-rule-in-17-billion-opioid-lawsuit-against-jj-idUSL2N25J1B7. The judgment in this case 
awarded $572 million but was reduced on appeal to $465 million. Nate Raymond & Jonathan Stempel, 
Oklahoma Judge Reduces Johnson & Johnson Opioid Payout to $465 Million, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2019, 
2:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-opioids-litigation-oklahoma/oklahoma-judge-reduces-
johnson-johnson-opioid-payout-to-465-million-idUSKBN1XP27F. 
 58. Nora Freeman Engstrom & Diana Garnet Li, Stanford Law Experts on Johnson & Johnson’s 
Product Liability Exposure, SLS BLOGS (Oct. 14, 2019), https://law.stanford.edu/2019/10/14/stanford-
law-experts-on-johnson-johnsons-product-liability-exposure/ (detailing the “tens of thousands of 
product liability lawsuits” against Johnson & Johnson); Peter Loftus, Judge Slashes Damages in J&J 
Risperdal Case to $6.8 Million From $8 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2020, 4:51 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-slashes-8-billion-jury-award-against-johnson-johnson-to-6-8-
million-in-risperdal-case-11579291494 (explaining that the jury award was reduced by the judge to $6.8 
million). 
 59. The scope of the learned intermediary doctrine across the United States is disputed. See, e.g., In 
re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp 2d 795, 806–09 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (showing 
forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico all to have either applied or recognized the 
learned intermediary doctrine); but see Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829 (2001) (finding only forty-
four jurisdictions have adopted or recognized the learned intermediary doctrine) and State ex rel. 
Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E. 2d 899, 903–04 (W. Va. 2007) (concluding that only twenty-
two states have expressly adopted the doctrine, including twenty-one supreme courts and the North 
Carolina state legislature). See generally Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and Sophisticated 
Users: Encouraging the Use of Intermediaries to Transmit Product Safety Information, 46 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 1185, 1232–40 (1996) (discussing the learned intermediary doctrine and concluding that only 
physicians should have the duty to communicate risk information to patients); Margaret Gilhooley, 
Learned Intermediaries, Prescription Drugs, and Patient Information, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 633, 657 
(discussing the development of learned intermediary doctrine and arguing that the emergence of robust 
informed consent doctrine necessitates a change in the physician’s role as learned intermediary); Lars 
Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 
GA. L. REV. 141, 178 (1997) (“Direct advertising encourages active participation by consumers in 
prescribing decisions, a favorable development that courts should not ‘reward’ by expanding the tort 
duties of drug manufacturers, and thereby, discouraging such advertising in the future”); Nancy K. Plant, 
The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Some New Medicine for an Old Ailment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 
1078 (1996) (noting that changes in the delivery of healthcare justify elimination of the learned 
intermediary doctrine); Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising and 
the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 829, 835 (1991); Charles J. Walsh et al., The 
Learned Intermediary Doctrine: The Correct Prescription for Drug Labeling, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 821, 
880 (1996) (discussing the durability of the learned intermediary doctrine and arguing that in the case of 
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Announced initially in 1966,60 the Learned Intermediary Doctrine states that 
manufacturers of prescription drugs can satisfy their duty to warn about 
“unavoidably unsafe” prescription drugs by providing appropriate warnings to 
prescribing physicians: it is not necessary to warn end-users of these drugs 
directly.61 This is because the physician’s medical “training and experience allow 
the physician to translate the technical details concerning the potential 
therapeutic benefits and known risks of the drug into specific recommendations 
and instructions for use by the individual patient.”62  Over the past fifty years, 
this doctrine has been the subject of extensive literature in law reviews and court 
commentary.63 
But what about physicians’ own liability for warning their patients about 
the side effects of prescription drugs? Physicians’ liability derives from a 
combination of a duty to warn, coupled with informed consent.64 While the term 
“informed consent” itself was first used in 1957,65 these general doctrines have 
a long history, going back to the beginning of the twentieth century, in cases such 
as Mohr v. Williams66 in 1905, and Schloendorff v. Society of New York 
Hospital67 in 1914.68 But what about the more specific case history and academic 
 
prescription drugs, information is best directed from the drug companies to medical professionals); 
Susan A. Casey, Comment, Laying an Old Doctrine to Rest: Challenging the Wisdom of the Learned 
Intermediary Doctrine, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 931, 958 (1993) (“[T]he learned intermediary 
doctrine is based on medical paternalism that is inconsistent with the concept of informed consent.”); 
Tim S. Hall, Note, Bypassing the Learned Intermediary: Potential Liability for Failure to Warn in 
Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 2 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 449, 461 (1993); 
Mae Joanne Rosok, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: After a Decade of 
Speculation, Courts Consider Another Exception to the Learned Intermediary Rule, 24 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 629, 629 (2000) (recognizing the impact of DTC advertising on increased product sales). 
 60. Sterling Drug Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966) (stating, “[i]n [a prescription 
drug] case the purchaser’s doctor is a learned intermediary between the purchaser and the manufacturer. 
If the doctor is properly warned of the possibility of a side effect in some patients, and is advised of the 
symptoms…there is an excellent chance that injury to the patient can be avoided.”). 
 61. Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the New Pharmaceutical 
Marketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193, 199 (2004). 
 62. Id. at 203. 
 63. See supra note 59. 
 64. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd, of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). 
 65. See generally id. (describing the circumstances and reasoning from which the court derived the 
term “informed consent”).  
 66. 104 N.W. 12, 15 (Minn. 1905) (stating “[i]f the physician advises his patient to submit to a 
particular operation, and the patient weighs the dangers and risks incident to its performance, and finally 
consents, he thereby, in effect, enters into a contract authorizing his physician to operate to the extent of 
the consent given, but no further.”). 
 67. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (stating “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a 
right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation 
without his patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”). 
 68. Valerie Gutmann Koch, Eliminating Liability for Lack of Informed Consent to Medical 
Treatment, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1211, 1213 (2019) (stating, “[l]ess than a century ago, courts sought to 
ensure patients’ autonomous medical decision making by affirming a private right of action for failure of 
informed consent. The tort of lack of informed consent is intended to compensate, or make whole, the 
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literature on physicians’ liability for the side effects of prescription drugs?  Given 
the extensive number of cases and academic literature on manufacturer’s 
liability, and the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, we might expect the case 
history and academic literature on physician’s liability likewise to be extensive. 
However, this is not the case. 
In 1986, Gerald Tietz published his article, Informed Consent in the 
Prescription Drug Context: the Special Case.69  In this article, he noted that while 
“patients frequently file suit against their physicians for failure to obtain an 
informed consent to surgery and other bodily invasive medical treatments”70 but, 
“medical patients rarely bring suit against prescribing physicians on an informed 
consent theory in the context of prescription drug therapy.”71 He estimated that 
the “number of reported appellate decisions, including cases involving 
prescription drug injections given by the treating physician and therefore 
involving no written prescription, is probably less than 20.”72 Our own review of 
the cases available on Lexis since 1985 found only twelve cases.73 
Furthermore, other than Tietz’s seminal piece, there is only one other 
article74 that directly examines physicians’ liability for side effects of 
prescription drugs and considers the special case “where the chance of 
occurrence [of a side effect] is extremely rare.”75 While there are academic 
literatures related to this issue, which we will discuss further below, there simply 
 
patient who is harmed by her doctor due to a failure to disclose the risks. . .[and] this tort is now firmly 
entrenched in precedent or codified by state statute.”). 
 69. Gerald F. Tietz, Informed Consent in the Prescription Drug Context: The Special Case, 61 
WASH. L. REV. 367, 367 (1986). 
 70. Id. at 367. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at n.1. 
 73. Niemiera v. Schneider, 555 A.2d 1112 (N.J, 1988); Robinson v. Health Midwest Dev. Group, 
No. WL212776, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 353 (Mar. 6, 2001); Walsh v. Tabby, WL1888856, 200 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 6231 (Apr. 17, 2003); Kuperstein v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d 467 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Coombes v. Florio, 877 N.E.2d 567 (Mass. 2007); Koch v. Cardiology Consultants, 
P.A., 2008 Del. Super. LEXIS 479 (May 16, 2008); Wilhoit v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 
WL702007, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21155 (Mar. 13, 2009); Velilla v. Asociación Hosp., 902 F. Supp. 
2d 211 (D.P.R. 2012); Gaghan v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., WL3798338, 2014 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1895 
(Feb. 10, 2014); Shannon v. Fusco, 89 A.3d 1156 (Md. 2014); Hanes v. Solgar, Inc., 2017 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 117 (Jan. 12, 2017); and Radzik v. Conn. Children’s Med. Ctr., 2017 Conn. Super. LEXIS 219 
(Jan. 27, 2017).  These cases were found using one of the following searches: “informed consent”/25 
“prescription drug”; physician/25 “side effect”/25 “prescription drug”; and physician /10 “duty to 
inform”/25 “prescription drug.” This search was last completed in February 2020.  
 74. The title of another article seems to suggest that it might examine physicians’ liability, but its 
focus instead is on maintaining the Learned Intermediary Doctrine exception for prescription drugs 
manufacturers’ liability: Laurie K. Marshall, Comment, Keeping the Duty to Warn Patients of the Risks 
and Side Effects of Mass- Marketed Prescription Drugs Where it Belongs: With Their Physicians, 26 
DAYTON L. REV. 95, 97 (2000). 
 75. Morris Dweck, Failing to Warn in the Context of Rare Side Effects, 12 CARDOZO PUB. L. 
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 423, 425 (2014). 
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has not been any article examining physicians’ liability for side effects of 
prescription drugs in general for over thirty years. 
Building upon the research on patient preferences we report in this paper, 
it is time to revisit this issue. Two of the key considerations in Tietz’s analysis – 
drawing themselves from Schloendorff76 and Canterbury v. Spence77 – were the 
“fundamental notion of individual autonomy. . .[and] the protection of the 
individual’s dignitary interest.”78 Placing these interests at the fore, our 
collection of data on patients’ perceptions and preferences about disclosures of 
side effects prompts a reconsideration of Tietz’s argument regarding how the law 
ought to determine the standard for disclosure by physicians regarding 
prescription drug side effects.79 
Much has changed since the 1986 publication of Tietz’s article. We have 
significantly different circumstances with the additional contexts of managed 
care and technological advances such as electronic health records.80 
Furthermore, with the first-of-its-kind data presented herein, we now have fresh 
insights available for physicians regarding the importance of this issue for 
maintaining the physician-patient relationship. With these new circumstances 
and new findings regarding patients’ perceptions, the standard of reasonableness 
must be revisited. 
A. Reviewing the Literature  
In this section, we begin with analysis of Tietz’s 1986 article, including its 
discussion of the standard for physicians’ liability for side effects of prescription 
drugs and its recommendations.81 We then review a number of other related 
literatures. 
 
 76. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (1914). 
 77. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (citing Schloendorff,105 
N.E. at 93 (“every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be 
done with his own body. . .”)). Canterbury was among the first cases to recognize and articulate the 
necessity of “a reasonable divulgence by physician to patient [i.e., adequate disclosure] to make such a 
decision [i.e., informed consent] possible.” Id. at 779. Jurisprudence in this area developed relatively 
rapidly in the context of several high-profile end-of-life cases involving newly discovered life-sustaining 
technologies. See generally Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (noting that 
before Quinlan, the number of right-to-refuse-treatment decisions was relatively few); Severns v. 
Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1336 (Del. 1980); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 
Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976).   
 78. Tietz, supra note 69, at 406. 
 79. Id. at 369–70. 
 80. Eta S. Berner et al., Will the Wave Finally Break? A Brief Review of the Adoption of Electronic 
Medical Records in the United States, 12 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 3 (2005).  
 81. Tietz, supra note 69, at 396. 
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1. Physicians’ Liability and Recommendations from Tietz 
Tietz begins his article reviewing the two most common models that courts 
have used to determine informed consent:  the “medical community” model and 
the “objective-patient/reasonable-patient” model.82 He then notes a number of 
“special factors” that are relevant in the context of “prescription drug therapy.”83 
In reviewing the cases on physicians’ liability based on informed consent for 
prescription drugs, Tietz finds that courts exhibit “deference to the medical 
profession,. . .[and] adopt and apply the medical-community standard of 
disclosure with little or no stated rationale and with rarely more than a reference 
to some unarticulated necessity to defer to the judgment of the medical 
profession.”84 In doing so, they “fail[] to recognize the special factors inherent 
in the prescription of drugs.”85 
Both models:  
 
[I]nclude[] standards for determining the three essential doctrinal 
elements of informed consent: whether the physician had a duty to 
disclose; the scope of that duty (what procedure-specific information 
must be disclosed); and, if the duty was breached, whether the breach 
proximately caused the patient’s injury (that is, whether the patient 
would not have consented to the procedure had adequate disclosure 
been made).86  
 
The two models differ in how these elements are applied. 
In the medical-community model, the existence and scope of the duty to 
disclose is based on “the practice of the local community of physicians,”87 and 
breach occurs when physicians “fail[] to disclose the alternatives and risks that 
practitioners in the medical community would have disclosed.”88 Proximate 
cause is shown by “prov[ing] that the hypothetical reasonable patient would not 
have agreed to take the drug had the physician made the required disclosure.”89 
Under the objective-patient/reasonable-patient model, “courts have decided 
that the judiciary has the responsibility for determining when the duty to inform 
attaches, rather than allowing the community of physicians to make that 
determination.”90 However, in determining this duty, the courts consider the 
 
 82. Id. at 370. 
 83. Id. at 384. 
 84. Id. at 396. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 371–72. 
 87. Id. at 372. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 374. 
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interests of an objective-patient, not a subjective individual-patient.91 
Furthermore, proximate cause is determined by asking, “[w]ould a ‘reasonable’ 
patient have consented to the medical procedure if the physician had made an 
adequate disclosure of the alternatives to and the risks associated with the 
proposed treatment?”92 
Tietz then highlights several factors relevant to prescription drugs that have 
been significantly ignored by courts: “Factors that should limit judicial deference 
to the medical profession”93 include “the pervasiveness of prescription drug use, 
the tendency of physicians to overprescribe these drugs, and the narrow limits of 
physicians’ pharmacological knowledge,”94 along with the “need for constant 
monitoring.”95 Tietz identifies “factors that affect patient participation and 
choice”96 such as “personal idiosyncrasies…the range of treatment alternatives, 
and…the risks of side effects.”97 These factors are key in the prescription drug 
context because they affect the willingness of patients themselves to engage in 
“the constant monitoring required during prescription drug therapy.”98 
Tietz finds that the “‘objective’ standard … does not depend on meaningful 
communication between physician and patient, but on a nondescript process that 
ultimately relies completely on medical opinion in lieu of patient 
participation.”99  Consequently, in order to promote “individual autonomy [and]  
…protect[]…the individual’s dignitary interest,”100 Tietz recommends that 
courts should “apply a subjective, individual-patient standard of disclosure in 
conjunction with a presumption of proximate cause.”101 Tietz summarizes the 
elements for physicians’ liability for informed consent concerning prescription 
drugs thus: 
 
To claim lack of informed consent in a prescription drug case, a 
plaintiff should have to establish the same elements required for other 
claims of lack of informed consent—duty, breach, causation (both in 
fact and proximate), and damages…The obligation of the physician is 
to communicate and not merely to disclose risks. The duty to 
communicate in a meaningful fashion, taking into consideration the 
unique aspects of prescription drug therapy, ultimately rests on the 
 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 385. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 389. 
 96. Id. at 392. 
 97. Id. at 385. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 407. 
 100. Id. at 406. 
 101. Id. at 370. 
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rights of bodily integrity and self-determination of the patient as an 
individual, not as a reasonable or average person…A breach of the 
prescribing physician’s duty consists of any failure to communicate 
with the patient in a meaningful fashion…The causation element of a 
plaintiff’s claim has two parts: causation in fact and proximate 
causation. Causation in fact is in reality medical causation, established 
by proof that the drug in fact caused the plaintiff’s injury. The 
proximate cause element of a plaintiff’s claim relates directly to the 
validity of the consent. The question is whether plaintiff would have 
consented to the drug therapy had adequate disclosure and discussion 
been provided by the prescribing physician.102 
 
Tietz concludes that these changes are necessary to protect “patients’ rights 
of self-determination and bodily integrity, as well as the intangible dignitary 
interest.”103 
2. Additional Literatures Related to Informed Consent and Prescription 
Drugs 
Several other pieces related to informed consent and prescription drugs are 
relevant to the issue of physicians’ liability in these cases.104 One such literature 
is consistent with Tietz’s analysis: commentators arguing that courts should 
adopt a “subjective,” real patient standard rather than an “objective” reasonable 
patient one.105 As discussed earlier, the Canterbury v. Spence case provides an 
important context for this literature.106 In this case, the D.C. Circuit wrote that 
physicians’ duty to disclose “must be measured by the patient’s need, and that 
need is the information material to the decision. . .All risks potentially affecting 
the decision must be unmasked.”107 
 
 102. Id. at 412–14. 
 103. Id. at 417. 
 104. See Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the New Pharmaceutical 
Marketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193, 234 (2004) (recognizing that patient autonomy is an 
important ethical goal in American medical practice); Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability 
Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOKLYN L. REV. 839, 855 (2009) (arguing that pharmaceutical 
interventions must be tailored to each patients’ unique circumstances); Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, 
Revitalizing Informed Consent and Protecting Patient Autonomy: an Appeal to Abandon Objective 
Causation, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 697, 697 (2012) (arguing that courts and legislatures should adopt a 
subjective patient standard for informed consent in order to account for individual preferences and 
priorities). 
 105. See, e.g., Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case 
for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 429, 445 (2006) (“A subjective-based 
standard, however, best reflects the ethical and legal foundations of informed consent and should 
represent the ultimate goal of an informed consent system.”). 
 106. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).  
 107. Id. at 786–87. 
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The court here showed a concern for individual autonomy and dignity in its 
reasoning, with one health law and ethics scholar suggesting that this case 
eventually has led to the situation where “patient autonomy is now virtually 
universally recognized as an ethical goal—some say the primary ethical goal—
of modern American medical practice.”108 However, despite this concern for 
autonomy and dignity, the court maintained an objective patient standard for 
informed consent, because it was worried about making “undue demand[s] upon 
medical practitioners.”109 For the most part, subsequent courts have followed this 
approach.110 
Additionally, just as Tietz observed, idiosyncrasies across patients should 
not be ignored. Lars Noah notes, “[w]hen it comes to pharmaceutical 
interventions, one size does not fit all.”111 He observes that the effectiveness of 
prescription drugs for particular patients depends on “factors such as the nature 
of their symptoms, progression of the underlying disease, presence of any 
concurrent conditions or use of other medications, and sensitivity to (or tolerance 
of) specific side effects.”112 
These concerns have led other health law and ethics scholars, in addition to 
Tietz, to argue for the adoption of an “subjective/actual patient” standard rather 
than an “objective/reasonable” one. Grant Morris, for one, notes that using a 
reasonable patient standard rather than an actual patient standard is clearly 
unreasonable:  
 
For converting the real patient’s interest in making an idiosyncratic 
judgment about what shall be done with his or her own body into the 
hypothetical person’s interest in making only the ‘correct’ judgment, 
the quotation from Humpty Dumpty seems most appropriate: “When 
I use a word (like autonomy or self-determination), it means just what 
I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”113 
 
 
 108. Hall, supra note 104, at 234, citing TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, 77–80 (5th ed. 2001); see also Tenenbaum, supra note 104, at 718 (stating that 
“the right to autonomy is now ‘deeply entrenched in our culture and law’ and is a ‘preeminent bioethical 
value.’”). 
 109. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787. 
 110. See, e.g., Weil v. Seltzer, 873 F.2d 1453, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that a physician failed 
to adequately disclose the medication or dangers of its long-term use to a patient under the objective 
standard articulated in Canterbury v. Spence).  
 111. Noah, supra note 104, at 855. 
 112. Id. at 856. 
 113. Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 313, 368 
(2002) (citing LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING-
GLASS 188 (New York, Hartsdale House)). 
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Evelyn Tenenbaum likewise argues that “courts and state legislatures 
[should] abandon objective causation and choose a standard that recognizes the 
importance of individual preferences and priorities.”114 She notes that:  
 
[T]he foundational principle behind informed consent laws is 
autonomy, the personal right of patients to make informed decisions 
concerning their medical care…The purpose of informed consent laws 
is to ensure that patient autonomy is respected—that the patient’s 
personal preferences, values, and goals are given deference and that 
the choice of medical care is ultimately the patient’s alone.115  
 
As a result, she argues that to protect individual autonomy, courts should 
adopt a subjective patient standard.116 Doing so will both “hopefully serve as a 
catalyst for meaningful disclosure [and]…focus attention on individual 
preferences and concerns.”117 
While a subjective standard could lead to more disclosure, more disclosure 
is not always better.118 Just as how too many warnings on a warning label may 
lead consumers to ignore them, too much information about prescription drugs 
can create problems for patients.119 Lars Noah observes that “[p]hysicians could 
not possibly disclose all information about the risks and benefits associated with 
different options for treating a particular condition, and, even if feasible, such 
comprehensive disclosures would not necessarily promote patient autonomy.”120 
In an earlier article, Noah explained that there are “substantial costs associated 
with the overuse of warnings, particularly the twin dangers of diluting the impact 
of more serious warnings and prompting counterproductive consumer behavior 
in response to overly alarming warnings about relatively insignificant risks.”121 
He further notes that the “risk of overreaction is not limited to lay consumers. 
Physicians are vulnerable as well.”122  
One concern regarding physicians is the phenomenon of over-warning of 
prescription drug side effects which can lead to adverse impacts on prescribing 
 
 114. Tenenbaum, supra note 104, at 698.  
 115. Id. at 718.  
 116. Id. at 745. 
 117. Id.  
 118. See, e.g., Noah, infra note 120 (describing the risks associated with excessive warning). 
 119. See, e.g., Noah, infra note 120 (describing how excessive disclosure may dilute serious risk and 
emphasize insignificant risks).  
 120. Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental 
Therapy, 28 AM. J. L. & MED. 361, 367 (2002). 
 121. Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the “Right to Know” from the “Need to 
Know” about Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 296 (1994). 
 122. Id. at 390. 
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decisions.123 Daniel Cantor likewise notes that “physicians are often unwilling to 
warn patients of the inherent risks of prescription drug use because the physicians 
fear that too much informed consent may frighten the patient and cause the 
patient to reject treatment.”124 So the question then becomes, where do we draw 
the line between too little and too much information? 
Another literature that clarifies physicians’ liability for prescription drugs 
is literature on the impact of managed care on informed consent.125 In 1999, Joan 
Krause “argued that the use of health care cost containment strategies has a 
detrimental effect on the doctrine of informed consent, particularly on the 
requirement that, in order to obtain truly ‘informed’ consent, physicians must 
disclose the existence of alternatives to the proposed treatment.”126 She noted 
that “current trends in the health care market give physicians and insurers 
incentives to withhold information about treatments that are not covered under 
the patient’s insurance policy.”127 As a result, she argued for three different 
changes, including changes to informed consent law, “consumer-oriented 
protections, [and]…utilizing the professional regulation system.”128 
In 2002, Grant Morris argued that due to “the emergence of managed 
care…no longer can physicians be trusted to make treatment decisions guided 
solely by their fiduciary obligation to their patients’ medical well-being. Insurers 
will not allow them to do so. Insurers also induce physicians to withhold 
information about their decisions.”129 Consequently, he suggested an alteration 
to physicians’ duty to inform patients, so that “[w]henever the physician’s 
clinical judgment of medically appropriate treatment differs from the HMO’s 
judgment of medically necessary treatment, the physician should inform the 
patient of this discrepancy.”130 
In 2004, Timothy Hall likewise noted the impact of managed care on duties 
to disclose and argued for a change to the Learned Intermediary rule.131  He noted 
several changes due to the “the twenty-first century American managed health 
care system.”132 For example, he pointed out that:  
 
 
 123. Id.  
 124. Daniel A. Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability and Product Safety:  
Lessons from the Vaccine Act, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 1853, 1869 (1995).  
 125. See generally John H. Krouse, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care 
Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261 (1999) (addressing the detrimental impact health care costs 
containment strategies has on the doctrine of informed consent). 
 126. Id. at 265. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 266. 
 129. Morris, supra note 113, at 316. 
 130. Id. at 363. 
 131. Hall, supra note 59. 
 132. Hall, supra note 61, at 196. 
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[P]atients receive far less personalized attention from their physicians, 
and are seen by a greater variety and diversity of physicians, than in 
the past. The average length of an office visit is shorter under 
aggressive managed care cost containment structures, providing less 
time for personal interaction and fewer opportunities for physicians to 
educate and inform their patients.133  
 
He further noted that “managed care organizations (“MCOs”) increasingly 
exert control over the doctor-patient relationship, including the choice of 
prescription drugs, through the use of pre-authorization requirements, 
formularies, and pharmacy benefit managers.”134 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our research and review of the literature lends support to the 
recommendations of Luana Colloca, who suggests a personalized approach to 
disclosure of information.135 Our results indicate that this might align well with 
what patients feel they are missing. A personalized disclosure approach can be 
sensitive to placebo effects and nocebo effects, attempting to respectively 
harness and minimize them while highlighting the most significant risks of a drug 
and coaching a patient to think through those risks. In his argument in favor of 
discretionary non-disclosure for the sake of minimizing nocebo effects, Alfano 
advises that nondisclosure is acceptable only for symptomatic side effects.136 
Fortunato, however, points out that this distinction may not necessarily track 
with the distinction between severe and non-severe side effects.137 Rebecca 
Erwin Wells and Ted J. Kaptchuk note that some types of side effects are “critical 
to reveal because they may result in more debilitating symptoms/conditions and 
thus may be more important for the patient’s full informed consent.”138 For 
illustration, they point to the possible life-threatening side effects of lymphoma 
with the use of cyclosporine and nephrolithiasis with topiramate use, as well as 
the heightened risks for those with a history of diabetes or psychiatric illness if 
prescribed prednisone.139 The responses given by patients in our study suggest 
that they too intuitively prioritize the importance of disclosing certain symptoms 
over others.  
 
 133. Id. at 196.  
 134. Id. 
 135. See generally Luana Colloca, Tell Me the Truth and I Will Not Be Harmed: Informed Consents 
and Nocebo Effects, 17 AM. J. BIOETHICS 46 (2017) (addressing the consequences of worse symptoms 
when patients are informed about the side effects of the treatment as a result of informed consent). 
 136. Alfano, supra note 12, at 8.  
 137. Fortunato et al., supra note 11, at 36–42. 
 138. Wells & Kaptchuk, supra note 15, at 25. 
 139. Id.  
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One of the pragmatic arguments against full disclosure is that doctors 
simply do not have enough time. For example, a majority of physicians report 
spending fewer than twenty minutes on average with their patients.140 With such 
limited time in the clinic, it is reasonable to privilege diagnostic analysis and 
addressing a patient’s questions over enumeration of potential drug side 
effects.141 Furthermore, as a practical matter, the spectrum of ways in which 
multiple drugs could interact in any individual patient could be beyond the ability 
of even the most experienced and knowledgeable prescribing physician, a reality 
even acknowledged by one of the respondents in our study.142 Indeed, 
particularly as compared to just a few decades ago, “there is an exponentially 
larger range of potential pharmacological therapies and an even larger, more 
complex and unpredictable set of potential side effects,” which, when 
compounded with an individual patient’s unique psychology, creates an 
“infinitely more complex medical landscape.”143 The urgency of this research is 
magnified by the ever-increasing number of drug combinations being prescribed 
to patients, especially over the age of sixty five. 
These practical concerns are perhaps mitigated to some extent by access to 
alternative sources of information on the Internet, enclosed in the package insert, 
through the pharmacist, or, in some contexts, by a different member of the 
healthcare team. In their response to Alfano, Meynen and Widdershoven point 
out that the current information environment, including internet reference 
sources and forums, drug manufacturer information, etc., effectively renders 
some proposed approaches to disclosure moot.144 Technological communication 
options have only continued to improve, offering the physician increasingly 
flexible options for informing patients. Indeed, technological symptom tracking 
via apps may greatly improve the physician’s ability to manage information 
around symptomatic effects, improving the quality of follow-up consultations, 
which are proposed by Fortunato et al., as a key component of a balanced 
approach to disclosure, and further discussed in Widdershoven et al.’s 
response.145 Nonetheless, the volume of information can easily overwhelm a 
patient, and its manner of presentation can either help or hinder their ability to 
interpret it, an issue fully explored in the literature of psychological “nudges” in 
 
 140. Carol Peckham, Medscape Physician Compensation Report 2016, MEDSCAPE (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://www.medscape.com/features/slideshow/compensation/2016/public/overview?src=wnl_physrep_
160401_mscpedit&uac=232148CZ&impID=1045700&faf. 
 141. Andreas Storm et al., Basic Drug Information Given By Physicians Is Deficient, and Patients’ 
Knowledge Low, 20 J. OF DERMATOLOGICAL TREATMENT 190, 190–93 (2009). 
 142. Louise Mallet et al., The Challenge of Managing Drug Interactions in Elderly People, 370 THE 
LANCET 185, 185–91 (2007). 
 143. Fortunato et al., supra note 11, at 39. 
 144. See generally Meynen & Widdershoven, supra note 23 (discussing two points of criticism 
concerning the empirical presuppositions of Alfano’s suggestions). 
 145. Fortunato et al., supra note 11, at 39; Widdershoven et al., supra note 50, at 48–50.  
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the medical context.146 Our findings suggest that many patients expect to or are 
willing to do their own research, but still desire the physician to help them flag 
the most salient risks.  
Moreover, the physician’s limited time with the patient, while it presents a 
logistical challenge, simultaneously underscores the importance of empowering 
patients. In these instances, fully informing patients of significant drug-specific 
side effects is not merely an act that is consistent with legal and ethical standards 
of patient autonomy, but in fact an act that empowers a patient to evaluate the 
trade-offs between potential consequences of a prescribed medication and the 
continuing symptoms of the underlying malady. One of our respondents in this 
study who experienced side effects they were not warned about illustrates: 
 
“I was extremely angry. These drugs were prescribed to control my 
epileptic grand mal seizures but the side effects of some were worse 
than the condition that they were supposed to help. A very bad trade 
off!”147 
 
While many bioethicists and physicians continue to exhibit paternalistic 
understandings of beneficence that interpret the best interests of the patient as a 
narrow set of “correct” medical choices, in many cases it is not realistic for a 
physician to make a holistic evaluation of what will best serve the patient’s 
overall quality of life. Patients must balance many different health concerns and 
often medications at once. Some side effects may be tolerable for one patient but 
highly problematic for another, depending on things like their occupation, 
psychiatric history, family responsibilities, pain tolerance, other medical 
decisions, or presence or absence of a support network. Moreover, prescriptions 
come at a financial cost, and physicians are not able to assess the wider health 
implications of those costs for each patient. The decision to go on a new 
prescription may involve additional trade-offs for patients in terms of stress, 
family dynamics, employability or job performance, and other lifestyle aspects 
that affect their overall health, in many cases even down to the level of basic 
interests such as food, shelter, and access to other prescriptions or forms of care.  
The significance and potential complexity of the trade-offs involved in 
making medical decisions require a fully enabled and supported patient 
autonomy. Other research has shown that properly informing patients leads to a 
feeling of empowerment as the patient is equipped with the information 
necessary to take control of her health, which can lead to improved patient 
adherence and overall health outcomes.148 Thus, a reasonable and realistic use of 
 
 146. Alfano, supra note 12, at 4, 9–10. 
 147. Survey Response, supra note 38.  
 148. Ronald M. Epstein et al., Communicating Evidence for Participatory Decision Making, 291 
JAMA 2359, 2361 (2004). 
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the physicians’ limited time with the patient would be to combine: (1) 
“highlighting” the most potentially significant information with modeling useful 
framing for their decision making, (2) coaching patients on how to filter the 
additional information they are provided, (3) directing them to consult with 
pharmacists or other relevant members of the healthcare team, and (4) deploying 
available consumer technology to improve symptom tracking.  
Furthermore, our findings and analysis of the informed consent law 
suggests an urgent need to balance patients’ stated desire to be informed about 
all prescription drug risks with their need to fully comprehend the relatively 
small subset of risk information that is most important in their treatment 
decisions. While patients should be provided access to all risk information, there 
is a danger that they will be overwhelmed by exhaustive lists of every possible 
side effect, and that this information overload will cause patients to overlook 
crucial risk information which, if known, might alter their decision to undergo 
treatment. 
An approach to disclosure that is patient-centered and premised on a desire 
to safeguard patient trust, i.e., responds to the information needs and desires of 
the patient and encourages the patient to take responsibility for his treatment, has 
been shown to improve health outcomes of chronically-ill patients.149 Premised 
on prior research and our study’s findings, one can imagine a doctor taking care 
to give a patient the choice as to whether he or she would prefer a modified choice 
or a more fulsome description. One can imagine the following approach, which 
recognizes and respects the patient’s autonomy in a very particularized way: “I 
am going to tell you the most frequent and significant side effects to be alerted 
for, but if you want a larger or more thorough description, I am happy to provide 
that information as well.”  
Similarly, physicians might consider adoption of a two-tiered presentation 
of risk information, in which: (1) the most important risk information is presented 
in an understandable format, to ensure that it is noticed and comprehended before 
the patient consents to treatment, and (2) patients are then provided with easily 
accessible and more exhaustive risk information that can protect the patient from 
any surprise adverse reaction that might work long-term damage on her ability 
to trust her healthcare provider. In a doctor-patient encounter, this might involve 
a brief face-to-face communication in which the prescriber mentions the drug’s 
most important risks, verifies patient comprehension of those risks, and then asks 
the patient if he or she would like to try the drug. Afterwards, the patient could 
be provided with a brochure or directed to a website enumerating all of the drug’s 
potential side effects and encouraged to call the office with any questions. 
Furthermore, larger clinical practices could benefit from the employment of a 
 
 149. Sherrie Kaplan et al., Assessing the Effects of Physician-Patient Interactions on the Outcomes 
of Chronic Disease, 27 MED. CARE S110, S111 (1989); Ledford et al., supra note 25. 
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clinical pharmacist, who could be on hand to explain any questions that patients 
have concerning prescription drug side effects, to help make doctors’ time with 
patients more efficient, and to protect against the potentially corrosive impact of 
a patient feeling blindsided or betrayed by misunderstood side effects.  
As noted by Ziegler and colleagues, “nonphysician information sources 
may influence attitudes in a variety of ways” and correlations between 
information provided in the clinic and information from direct-to-consumer 
(DTC), Internet or other sources need further research.150 For drug companies 
engaging in DTC advertising, the drug’s most important risks could be presented 
(with the same clarity and prominence as the presentation of the drug’s benefits) 
within both broadcast commercials and the main “display advertisement” portion 
of print advertisements.151 Then, a more exhaustive side effect list could be 
provided in the “brief summary” page of print ads, as well as a web site 
referenced in both broadcast and print advertisements.  
From a regulatory perspective, these suggestions may be more likely to be 
applied if courts adopt more patient-centered approaches to informed consent in 
the context of prescription drugs, whether it be a “materiality of risk” or 
“reasonable patient” standard, or even further to a “subjective, individual-patient 
standard.” Given the evolving contexts of managed care and technological 
advances, such a change may be warranted. 
The use of this two-tiered risk communication approach would be furthered 
by adopting changes to the legal approach that were recommended by Tietz over 
thirty years ago.152 As noted above, many courts have already adopted a patient-
centered approach for determining duties and breach, by applying the 
“materiality of risk” or “reasonable patient” standard.153 However, given the 
paucity of cases on this issue in the past thirty years, no court also has applied 
the “subjective, individual-patient standard” for proving causation, as 
recommended by Tietz.154 Adoption of this “real patient”-centered legal standard 
for causation would provide additional incentives for physicians to use the two-
tiered risk communication approach suggested here.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Our study represents an important first step to better understanding – 
informed by the patient’s perspective – of an ethical Catch-22 facing prescribing 
 
 150. Ziegler et al., supra note 10, at 712. 
 151. Perry et al., supra note 24, 729–78. 
 152. Tietz, supra note 69, at 406. 
 153. See supra Section III. 
 154. See, e.g., Niemiera v. Schneider, 114 N.J. 550, 563 (stating, “Some commentators have urged a 
stricter subjective standard of informed consent with respect to prescription drugs, that is, one related to 
the particular patient. [citing Tietz]. . .We are satisfied, however, that the ‘prudent patient’ standard can 
be applied in this case”). 
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physicians. In short, the dilemma is one of limited clinical time and finite 
pharmacological knowledge on the part of the prescribing physician, as well as 
a potentially well-intentioned but ultimately misguided pinch of paternalism, set 
against a patient who believes he’d like to be informed about “all side effects” – 
even if ultimately immaterial to his willingness to be compliant. Our qualitative 
data demonstrate that a patient who feels under-informed has a significant 
likelihood of losing trust in the physician and in medicine more broadly if he 
experiences an adverse side effect not previously discussed with his physician. 
This previously under-studied effect raises the stakes for an already tricky 
dilemma. In light of the risks, both direct and indirect, how should prescribers 
manage the disclosure of information about prescription drug risks? 
Our paper has several important implications for both healthcare providers 
and regulators. First, our study suggests an urgent need to understand the stakes 
when deciding how to balance patients’ stated desire to be informed about all 
prescription drug risks with their need to fully comprehend the relatively small 
subset of risk information that is most important in their treatment decisions. On 
the one hand, disclosing too little risk information may hamper patients’ ability 
to make informed decisions about their own medical care, undermine patients’ 
trust in their physicians, and potentially create legal liability exposure for 
prescribers and perhaps drug manufacturers. On the other hand, presenting 
patients with long lists of all conceivable risks of a prescription drug – even if 
feasible – may result in information overload, causing patients to miss the 
“needle in the haystack;” i.e., the truly important risk information that might alter 
their treatment decisions.155  
Additionally, considering time pressures in the clinic, it seems especially 
important to help physicians identify the specific risk information that is most 
essential to patients’ informed decision making, so that it can be conveyed during 
a very brief encounter. This study represents an initial effort to shed some light 
on these issues. We strongly encourage further researchers to continue this line 
of inquiry, so that we can better understand the obstacles to improved doctor-
communication about prescription drug risks and develop strategies to overcome 
these obstacles. 
As is so often the case, relational dynamics provide a guide for ethical 
conduct, and a patient’s trust in their physician – a critical component to 
accepting that a recommended treatment decision is the right one to follow – will 
either be enhanced or eroded depending on the openness and candor with which 
 
 155. KATHRYN J. AIKIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS 
ASSOCIATED WITH DTC PROMOTION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS—SUMMARY OF FDA SURVEY 
RESEARCH RESULTS (2004), https://www.fda.gov/files/drugs/published/Patient-and-Physician-Attitudes-
and-Behaviors-Associated-With-DTC-Promotion-of-Prescription-Drugs-Final-Report.pdf. 
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the physician communicates to the patient.156 In other words, a physician must 
beware of paternalistically hiding the ball out of a well-intended concern of 
causing the patient to be alarmed. Such an approach, as our findings illustrate, 
may backfire and the unpleasant surprise of an adverse drug reaction may create 
a level of anger and frustration that undermines any positive or persuasive effect 
the physician’s prescribed course of therapy might have otherwise achieved.   
We encourage future researchers to continue these lines of inquiry, so that 
we can better understand the obstacles to effective communication around 
prescription drug risks and develop strategies and best practices that will 
ultimately result in an enhanced level of trust between patient and provider. As 
Lantos ominously warned: “[t]rust between doctors and patients, once lost, may 
be impossible to regain.”157 
 
 156. Meynen & Widdershoven, supra note 23, at 19–20; Glenn Salkeld et al., A Matter of Trust—
Patient’s Views on Decision-Making in Colorectoral Cancer, 7 HEALTH EXPECTATIONS 104, 104–05 
(2004). 
 157. Lantos, supra note 35, at 1–2. 
